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The Federal Trade Commission and
Pyramid Sales Schemes-
RALPH E. STONE**and
JEROME M. STEINER, JR.**
Pyramid sales schemes that illegally deceive most participants are pro-
liferating across the nation These sales schemes grow rapidly and affect
thousands of people before law enforcement agencies can act. State agen-
cies, consumer self-help remedies, and market forces frequently are inade-
quate to address the problems created by pyramid sales schemes. This
article suggests a legal theory that the Federal Trade Commission (herein-
after referred to as the Commission) can use to curb the deceptions of pyr-
amid sales promoters.
A pyramid sales scheme is a special type of business opportunity. The
* The authors are staff attorneys in the Federal Trade Commission's San Fran-
cisco Regional Office. The opinions expressed in this article are solely the authors', how-
ever, and do not necessarily reflect the view of the FTC or any individual commissioner.
** B.A., Middlebury College (1961); J.D., Suffolk University (1971).
B.A., Miami University (1962); J.D., Washington University (1965).
1. Pyramid sales schemes have been characterized as the major consumer fraud
problem in the United States. Hearings on S. 1939 Before the Subcomm.for Consumers of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. Ser. 90, at 14 (1974) (statement of Sen.
Walter F. Mondale). The size of the pyramid sales industry is substantial. In the early
1970s, an estimated 150 pyramid sales schemes were operating in the United States. See
Address by William J. Casey, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 55th
Annual Conference of the North American SecurityAdministrators (Sept. 1972), summarized
in Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 580, at A-4 (Sept. 19, 1972). See also N.Y.
Times, Jan. 13, 1972, at 59, col. 5 (estimating 200 pyramid schemes nationwide). Probably
as many pyramid companies operate today, some of which are as large as the major pyra-
mids of the past. Estimating the size of the pyramid sales industry is difficult because no
industry statistics are available and because of the transitory nature of the companies in the
industry. The authors believe, however, that sales of over $100 million by 100 firms would
be a conservative estimate. Importantly, the cast of firms may change from year to year as
old pyramids collapse and new ones are constructed.-
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primary vice of most business opportunities challenged by the Commis-
sion is the deceptive earnings claims made by the promoters of the oppor-
tunity. In the traditional business opportunity case, the Commission
generally must prove that the promised earnings were not achieved by the
typical or average participant.' In contrast, proof of actual failure to
achieve promised earnings is unnecessary in the case of a pyramid sales
scheme because the earnings claims inevitably will prove to be false by the
mere operation of the plan. Every participant in a pyramid sales scheme
cannot achieve the promised earnings because the geometric increase in
participants virtually eliminates any chance of success by later partici-
pants.3 This phenomenon is known as market saturation.
In this article, the authors set forth a legal theory that would permit the
Commission to challenge pyramid sales schemes in an effective and sum-
mary manner. Specifically, the authors suggest that the Commission chal-
lenge the earnings claims made by the promoters that are based upon the
pyramiding of new recruits. A challenge to those earnings claims will be
effective in curbing the growth of pyramid sales schemes because pyramid
promoters will find it impossible to recruit participants without repre-
senting an expected level of earnings. First, the Commission definition of
a pyramid sales scheme will be discussed, followed by an analysis of the le-
gal theories that the Commission has used in prosecuting pyramid sales
schemes.
DEFINING A PYRAMID
An illegal pyramid sales scheme was defined by the Commission in
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.4 In that case, the Commission characterized a
pyramid sales scheme as a plan in which a participant pays money to the
company and in return receives (1) the right to sell products, and (2) the
right to earn rewards for recruiting other participants into the scheme that
are unrelated to product sales.5 The second element is nothing more than a
2. See, e.g., National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488 (1973), aff'dinpartandrev'd
inpart, 492 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974).
3. It is well established that the tendency and capacity to deceive, and not actual
deception resulting in injury, are the criteria by which practices are tested under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(1)(1982). In FTC v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 317 F.2d 669 (2nd Cir. 1963), the court stated:
In order best to implement the prophylactic purpose of the statute, it has been con-
sistently held that advertising falls within its proscription not only when there is
proof of actual deception but also when the representations made have a capacity
or tendency to deceive, i.e., when there is a likelihood or fair probability that the
reader will be misled....
317 F.2d at 674.
4. 86 F.T.C. 1106(1975), affdmem. sub. nom., Turnerv. FTC, 580 F.2d 701 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
5. 86F.T.C. 1106, 1180(1975).
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complex chain letter device in which participants are certain to be disap-
pointed.6 In Koscot, the Commission noted that pyramid sales schemes
are not commercially feasible ventures because the presence of a profita-
ble right to sell distributorships or franchises encourages participants to
pursue this aspect of the scheme, while ignoring the sale of products to
consumers.7 The short-term results may be large profits for pyramid pro-
moters and select, early distributors, but the long-term results will be the
disregard of market development, earnings misrepresentations, and in-
sufficient retail sales to support the great number of participants who
have been recruited into the scheme. 8
The incentives for the participant in a legitimate multi-level distribu-
tion plan are to make retail sales rather than to build and profit from a
pyramid of recruits.9 The legitimate company enters the marketplace on a
long-term, ongoing basis and depends upon continuing retail sales for
success. The selected distribution system is designed to emphasize prod-
uct sales, rather than a continuous sale of distributorships. Sales persons
must be given the incentive to sell the product or service. 10 The legitimate
company has little incentive to saturate the marketplace with distributor-
ships or sales personnel because saturation would adversely affect retail
sales and ultimately, the long-term success of the company.
Conversely, the incentives for the participant in an illegal pyramid are
to profit from a pyramid of recruits rather than to make retail sales.1 Pyr-
amid schemes are dependent upon continual recruitment of new partici-
pants. Promoters are interested only in recruiting until the market
becomes saturated and the scheme falls apart. 2 The pyramid promoter,
therefore, structures the incentives to encourage participants to empha-




9. See Amway Corporation, Inc., 93 F.T.C. 618,672-73 (1979); see also Senate Re-
port, S. 1939, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. (1974), reprintedin S. Rep. No. 1114, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1974), at 6 (Senate Report on proposed Pyramid Sales Act that passed the Senate but died
in the House of Representatives upon expiration of the 93d term) [hereinafter referred to as
Senate Report]. The authors do not propose that the Commission challenge legitimate
multi-level plans using the legal theory set forth in this article. Rather the Commission
should continue to treat the legitimate multi-level plan as a traditional business opportu-
nity.
10. Amway, for example, enforced rules that served to encourage retail selling and
prevent inventory loading. 93 F.T.C. at 716. See generally M. ZOBER, PRINCIPLES OF MAR-
KETING 263-66 (text ed. 1971).
11. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 86 F.T.C. at 1180; Amway, 93 F.T.C. at 715.
12. The Commission found the Ger-Ro-Mar pyramid sales scheme deceptive by a
mere perusal of the plan as set forth in the sales manual and promotional literature. Ger-
Ro-Mar, Inc., 84 F.T.C. 95, 140-50 (1974), af/d in part, rev'd in part sub nom., Ger-Ro-Mar
v. F.T.C., 518 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1975).
13. See generally LEFF, SWINDLING AND SELLING 88-111 (1976) (explanation of
pyramid sales schemes). The operation of a typical pyramid sales scheme is explained more
fully at notes 74-79 and accompanying text, infra.
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Legitimate multi-level marketing plans or franchises are not inherently
deceptive. Although the rapid proliferation of participants ispossible with
multi-level and franchise plans, and may indeed result in participants be-
ing deceived about their chances for success, 4 the deception of partici-
pants is virtually inevitable in pyramid schemes.'5
In a typical franchise organization, only the franchisor is selling
franchises.' 6 The franchisor can control the number and location of fran-
chisees to maximize retail sales. Similarly, a legitimate multi-level com-
pany has no reason to enroll distributors indiscriminately, but can be
expected to enroll the number that will result in the most effective distri-
bution of its product. In a pyramid scheme, however, each franchisee is, in
effect, selling additional franchises. Once the pyramid scheme is imple-
mented, the promoter loses control of the plan because the success prom-
ised to each participant is dependent on a pyramiding of new participants.
The proliferation of participants may result in either a saturation of the
market with distributors or an "equilibrium" short of saturation, in which
the number of persons dropping out balances the number of new re-
cruits.17 In either case, allparticipants will be unable to attain the earnings
claimed for the selling plan.
BACKGROUND OF THE PYRAMID PHENOMENON
In early cases, the Commission applied the antilottery theory to prose-
cute pyramid sales schemes.18 The Commission asserted that pyramid
sales schemes were in the nature of a lottery and should be unlawfulperse.
The antilottery approach is rooted in a long line of decisions 9 that have
14. See, e.g., National Dynamics Corp., supra note 2.
15. See Ger-Ro-Mar, Inc., 84 F.T.C. at 147-48; Holiday Magic, Inc., 84 F.T.C. 748,
1037 (1974); Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 86 F.T.C. at 1182.
16. Franchisees receive the further protections of the Commission's Trade Regula-
tion Rule, Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business
Opportunity Ventures, 15 C.F.R. §436 (1983); see Senate Report, supra note 9, at 6. See gen-
erally G. GLICKMAN, 15 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (Franchising) (1974); C. VAUGHN,
FRANCHISING (1974) (explanation of franchise operations).
17. Saturation may never occur. Rather, some sort of equilibrium may be reached
where as many drop out asjoin the scheme. This equilibrium itself is evidence of the failure
of the scheme. Those who drop out will themselves fail to achieve the promised earnings
and will further cause the failure of preceding generations of distributors whose success de-
pended on continued recruiting by the drop-outs. Equilibrium simply indicates that the
pyramid scheme has failed to mature to its full potential for deception, not that deception is
absent. See Ger- Ro-Mar, Inc., 84 F.T.C. at 146-47.
18. See, e.g., Ger-Ro-Mar, Inc., 84 F.T.C. at 100; Holiday Magic, Inc., 84 F.T.C. at
755-58; Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 86 F.T.C. at 1111-14; Devour Chem. Co., 81 F.T.C.
551 (1972); Int'l. Safe-T-Trac, Inc., 79 F.T.C. 318 (1971); Bestline Products Corp., 79
F.T.C. 107 (1971); Chemical Associates, Inc., 77 F.T.C. 1500 (1970); see also Comrmssion
advisory opinions 16 C.F.R. §15.155 (1983); 16 C.F.R. §15.241 (1983); 16 C.F.R. §15.404
(1983).
19. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934); Peerless
Products, Inc. v. F.T.C., 284 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844 (1961).
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held games of chance used in the merchandising of goods to beper se vio-'
lations of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (hereinafter re-
ferred to as FTC Act).2" Games of chance were considered a type of
lottery, and therefore against public policy.21
Courts have applied the traditional antilottery approach to pyramid
sales schemes by finding that the requisite elements of a lottery are also
present in pyramid schemes.22 A lottery involves three elements: (1) a
prize, (2) according to chance, and (3) for a consideration.23 A participant
in the pyramid scheme pays an investment fee or purchases merchandise
(consideration) to participate in a chance at a profit (prize) by recruiting
others. Chance is considered to be at the core of a pyramid scheme be-
cause success is beyond the control of any individual participant. The
chance of successfully recruiting other participants is dependent upon the
number of participants who have previously participated.
The traditional approach to games of chance changed in 1969 when the
Commission issued the Trade Regulation Rulefor Games of Chance in the
Food Retailing and Gasoline Industries.24 The Commission decided to re-
move the prohibition on games of chance in these two industries and to
regulate the games instead. In Marco Sales Company v. FTC,25 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized an anomaly in regulating games of
chance in some areas while prohibiting them in others and overruled a
Commission order prohibiting a game of chance. In Marco, a sales com-
pany sent literature through the mail describing merchandise that was
sold by push or punch cards.2 6 By punching out a disc in the card, a cus-
tomer learned the cost of the specially priced merchandise that was being
offered for sale. 7 The cost of a specific piece of merchandise ranged from
zero to thirty-nine cents.28 The Commission issued an order prohibiting
Marco's game because the game was in the nature of a lottery.29 The
Marco court struck down the order because of the disparate treatment ac-
corded Marco Sales Company in comparison to the food retailing and
20. 15 U.S.C. section 45 (a)(1) (1982) states: "Unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
hereby declared unlawful."
21. R. F. Keppel& Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. at 313-14; Dandy Products, Inc. v. FTC, 332
F.2d 985, 986 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
22. See Frye v. Taylor, 263 So. 2d 835 (Fla. App. 1972); State ex rel. Morgan v. Dare
To Be Great, Inc., 15 N.C. App. 275, 189 S.E.2d 802 (Ct. App. 1972); State ex rel. Lefkowitz
v. I.T.M., Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39,274 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1966); Comment, Trade Regulation: Ex-
amination of Games of Chance andReferral Sellingas Sales PromotionalDevices, 17 U. KAN.
L. REv. 668,669-74 (1969) (critical analysis of the antilottery approach).
23. FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284,290- 91 (1954).
24. 16 C.F.R. §419 (1983).
25. 453 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1971).
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Marco Sales Company, 78 F.T.C. 454,462-63 (1971).
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gasoline industries.3" The Commission, on the one hand, had only regu-
lated games in the food retailing and gasoline industries while in Marco,
the Commission had prohibited the game of chance altogether.
The approach of the Commission to pyramid sales schemes has evolved
from first treating the schemes as lotteries, to an approach based on an in-
herent deception theory, as exemplified by Ger-Ro-Mar, Inc.,31 Holiday
Magic, Inc.,32 and Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.33 The first pyramid sales
case adjudicated by the Commission was Ger-Ro-Mar.
Ger-Ro-Mar is the only Commission case that was tried on the theory
that a pyramid sales plan, apart from any specific misrepresentations, is
inherently deceptive due to the inevitability of market saturation. Under
thisper se theory, a demonstration of market saturation is unnecessary.
34
In that case, the Commission found that Ger-Ro-Mar was engaged in the
sale and distribution of "Symbra'ette" brand brassieres, girdles, lingerie,
swimwear, and wigs through a multi-level marketing plan. A participant
in the marketing plan obtained the right to purchase products at a dis-
count and sell them at retail prices for a profit.35 The Ger-Ro-Mar scheme
was challenged at trial in three separate counts, each resting on a different
legal theory. Count one was grounded on a traditional antilottery the-
ory,36 count two was grounded on an inherent deception theory,37 and
count three charged that Ger-Ro-Mar had made specific misrepresenta-
tions, including false earnings claims in connection with the promotion of
the scheme.38
The Commission found the Ger-Ro-Mar plan unfair and deceptive be-
cause the plan presented the opportunity to make money by recruiting
others, with the right to recruit passed on to other participants as an in-
ducement for them tojoin. This type of plan, the Commission concluded,
contains the "intolerable potential to deceive." 39 The Commission also
found that Ger-Ro-Mar had misrepresented the earning potential of the
scheme in its promotional materials even though no evidence was intro-
duced showing that the promised earnings were not achieved by the typi-
30. 453 F.2dat3.
31. 84 F.T.C. 95 (1974), affdin part, rev'd in part sub. nom., Ger-Ro-Marv. F.T.C.,
518 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1975). Case Comment, 9 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1406 (1975). The authors
were the complaint counsel in the Ger-Ro-Mar case.
32. 84 F.T.C. 748 (1974).
33. 86 F.T.C. 1106 (1975), affdmemn. sub nom., Turnerv. F.T.C., 580 F.2d 701 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
34. 84 F.T.C. at 145-48.
35. Id. at 106-07.
36. Id. at 100
37. Id at 100-01.
38. Id at 102. The complaint also charged Ger-Ro-Mar with wholesale and retail
price fixing and other restrictive practices. Id. at 103.
39. Id at 148.
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cal or average participant.' After analyzing the Ger-Ro-Mar marketing
plan as set forth in the sales manual and promotional literature, the Com-
mission concluded that all participants could not possibly succeed in the
manner portrayed.4 Ger-Ro-Mar's pyramid sales scheme, and the earn-
ings representations made to promote it, therefore were found by the
Commission to be deceptive.
The Commission did not uphold the finding of the administrative law
j udge that the Ger-Ro-Mar plan was a type of lottery.42 The Commission,
noting the difficulty of distinguishing the large element of chance con-
tained in Ger-Ro-Mar's plan from that found in many legitimate business
opportunities, did not find that chance, an essential element of a lottery,
was the sole appeal of the plan.43 The holding in Ger-Ro-Mar, therefore,
strikes a death knell for the use of the antilottery approach to pyramid
sales schemes, at least in cases brought before the Commission.'
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed45 the part of the ruling by the
Commission proscribing the marketing plan because some evidence of
market saturation had not been shown.' The court held that the market-
ing plan could not be found by the Commission to violate section 5 of the
FTC Act based solely on a theory or mathematical formula.47 The court,
however, upheld the determination of the Commission that the earnings
claims contained in the advertisements promoting Ger-Ro-Mar's pyra-
mid sales schemes-as opposed to the pyramid plan itself-were decep-
tive, even in the absence of market saturation or evidence that the
promised earnings were in fact not achieved by the typical participant.48
40. Id at 149-50. It is well established that the Commission may draw its own infer-
ences from an advertisement. The Commission need not depend on testimony or exhibits
introduced into the record. Carter Products, Inc. v. F.T.C., 323 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir.
1963); Zenith Radio Corp. v. F.T.C., 143 F.2d 29,31 (7th Cir. 1944).
41. 84 F.T.C. at 150.
42. Id. at 153-55.
43. Id
44. See Holiday Magic, Inc., 84 F.T.C. at 1038 n.7 (Commission vacated portions
of Initial Decision and Order dealing with lottery count); Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 86
F.T.C. at 1160 (lottery count dismissed). In the authors' opinion, this is a wise decision be-
cause the antilottery theory was designed for unsophisticated games of chance, and not for
clever schemes disguised as commercially feasible business opportunities. See LEFF, SWIN-
DLING AND SELLING 109-11 (1976).
45. Ger-Ro-Mar, Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1975).
46. The court stated:
[W]e have no study or analysis in the record which would realistically establish that
some recruiting saturation exists which would make the entry of additional distrib-
utors and the recruitment of others potentially impossible in any practical sense.
Id at 37. See also U.S. v. Bestline Products Corp., 412 F. Supp. 754,777 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
47. 518 F.2d at 37-38.
48. Ger-Ro-Mar, 518 F.2d at 38-39. The seemingly inconsistent result reached by
the court in Ger-Ro-Mar cannot be fully explained. The court found the promotion of the
pyramid plan to be deceptive and in doing so may have applied an inherent deception stan-
dard. The court points to evidence in the record to support the finding of deception. Id. at
39. However, the court did not indicate the exact evidence it relied upon and stated no legal
standard for the finding.
Three possible explanations exist for the result reached by the Ger-Ro-Mar Court.
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Shortly after the Commission issued the Ger-Ro-Mar opinion, but prior
to the decision of the court of appeals in Ger-Ro-Mar, the Commission de-
cided the case of Holiday Magic, Inc.49 Holiday Magic was engaged in the
sale and distribution of cosmetics, toiletries, and cleaning products
through a multi-level distribution program. A participant could buy into
the program at different levels, and each level required a different initial
investment. Participants in the program obtained the right to purchase
products at discount and sell them at retail for a profit. In addition, the
Holiday Magic program emphasized the large earnings that could be
achieved by a participant through commissions paid for sponsoring new
distributors. Participants could also earn commissions and overrides on
the products that the new distributors sold.5" In Holiday Magic, complaint
counsel demonstrated actual market saturation. The Commission, how-
ever, citing its own opinion in Ger-Ro-Mar, indicated that an order pro-
scribing the Holiday Magic plan would have been issued even in the
absence of proof of market saturation because the potential for deception
would have remained." The Commission continued to favor the summary
approach to pyramid schemes enunciated in Ger-Ro-Mar5 2
After the Holiday Magic decision, and after the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals decided Ger-Ro-Mar, the Commission rendered its opinion in
First, the only evidence in the record was the promotional literature used by Ger-Ro-Mar.
The record did not contain evidence of actual earnings achieved by participants. Therefore,
the court apparently applied an inherent deception standard to the representations, the very
standard it had specifically rejected earlier as to theplan itself. Second, the opposite conclu-
sion could also be reached by a reasonable reading of the decision of the court. The opinion
infers that the court relied upon evidence in addition to the promotional literature to sup-
port the finding that the representations were misleading. Any other reading produces an
apparent inconsistency between the treatment of the plan and the treatment of the repre-
sentations. Finally, the best explanation for the seemingly inconsistent decision of the
court is that the respondents had, in effect, conceded the misrepresentation issue in their re-
ply brief.
We further note that the petitioners, in their reply brief, have conceded that "[I]f
there be any questionable conduct on the part of Symbra'ette, it must be in the al-
leged misrepresentation in its advertising. The ends ofjustice will be met and any
misconduct will be obviated by merely prohibiting misrepresentations in the ad-
vertising." We are inclined to agree and affirm and enforce paragraphs 3,4, 5, 6, 7
and 8 of the final order.
Id. Thus, the Ger-Ro-Mar court never decided the issue of whether earnings claims based
upon the pyramiding of new recruits are inherently deceptive.
49. 84 F.T.C. 748 (1974).
50. Id. at 1035-38.
51. Id. at 1037.
52. Id. In this regard, the Commission stated: "Indeed, a tragic aspect of this case is
that the challenged marketing plan was not obliterated in its infancy, before the seed of de-
ception ripened into the poisonous fruit of fraud and oppression." Id. Complaint counsel
in Holiday Magic also demonstrated that the typical distributor actually failed to make the
promised earnings. The opinion of the Commission, however, clearly indicates that this
type of proof was not necessary to support the conclusion that the earnings representations
were deceptive. 84 F.T.C. at 1032-38. The Commission also found that Holiday Magic had
engaged in price discrimination in violation of subsection (a) of section 2 of the Clayton
Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. section 13(a)(1 982) and engaged
in illegal price fixing and other restrictive practices in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act.
Id. at 1049-60.
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the case of Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.53 Koscot was engaged in the sale
and distribution of cosmetics and toiletries through a multi-level distribu-
tion program that resembled the plan in Holiday Magic.54 The Commis-
sion, in apparent disregard of the Ger-Ro-Mar court, cited its earlier
decisions in Ger-Ro-Mar and Holiday Magic and continued to adhere to
the application of an inherent deception standard to both the marketing
plan and the earnings misrepresentations. Although complaint counsel
demonstrated market saturation, the opinion of the Commission makes
clear that the decision rested on the deception inherent in the plan, and
not on any actual injury suffered as a result of market saturation.15
In Koscot, the administrative law judge found that Koscot misrepre-
sented the earnings potential of the plan. This finding was based on two
independent theories:56 (1) actual proof of the falsity of the representa-
tion, and (2) the "mathematical fallacy" inherent in the plan. The Com-
mission adopted these findings of the judge and issued an order
proscribing the deceptive earnings claims.57
A mway Corporation, Inc.5 8 is the most recent Commission statement
about pyramid sales schemes. Amway was engaged in the manufacture,
sale, and distribution of cleaning and personal care products through a
multi-level distribution plan. The Commission found that the Amway
distribution plan was not illegal because the plan emphasized sales to ulti-
mate consumers rather than the recruitment of new distributors. The
Amway plan ensured that a participant's success must be based on retail
sales. First, the plan enforced a "seventy percent" rule whereby each dis-
tributor was required to sell at least seventy percent of the total amount of
products he bought during a month to receive bonuses on total products
purchased. 9 Second, the "ten customer" rule required at least one sale at
retail to ten different customers in a month to be eligible for bonuses.6" In
addition, the Amway plan included a "buy-back" rule, stating that a
sponsoring distributor shall "[p]urchase back from any of his personally
sponsored distributors leaving the business, upon his request, any unused,
currently marketable products.... 6 The Commission noted that this
"buy-back" rule prevented a sponsoring distributor from loading an un-
realistically large amount of inventory onto his sponsored distributors, a
53. 86 F.T.C. 1106(1975), affdmem. sub nom., Turnerv. F.T.C., 580 F.2d 701 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
54. 86 F.T.C. at 1178-82.
55. Id. at 1180-82.
56. 86 F.T.C. at 1132-35.
57. The Commission also found that Koscot, like Holiday Magic, had engaged in
price discrimination, in illegal price fixing and other restrictive practices. Seesupra note 52.
58. 93 F.T.C. 618 (1979).
59. Id. at 716.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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major problem in Holiday Magic and Koscot. The "seventy percent" rule,
the "ten customer" rule, and the "buy-back" rule, the Commission con-
cluded, served to encourage retail sales and prevent inventory loading.
The incentives for the participant were to make retail sales rather than to
build a pyramid of recruits. These features of the Amway plan made it sig-
nificantly different from the plans condemned by the Commission in Ger-
Ro-Mar, Holiday Magic, and Koscot 2
The complaint counsel in Amway introduced evidence that the typical
Amway distributor did not earn the monies promised. The earnings
claims made by Amway, however, were not based upon the pyramiding of
new recruits. Instead, Amway had made generalized earnings claims that
held out the possibility of earning at least $12,000 per year.63 The evidence
showed, however, that only one-half of one percent of the total number of
Amway distributors made more than $10,000 in profits.' The Commis-
sion, therefore, issued an order prohibiting these earnings claims.6 The
Commission cited National Dynamics Corp.,66 a traditional business op-
portunity case, for the proposition that Amway had misrepresented earn-
ings claims concerning the profitability of a distributorship and therefore,
had made an illegal misrepresentation in violation of section 5 of the FTC
Act.67 Nonetheless, the Commission clearly indicated that Amway was
not a pyramid case because the Amway plan did not contain the essential
features of an illegal pyramid scheme.68 Specifically, the Amway plan was
not a scheme in which participants purchased the right to earn profits by
recruiting other participants, who themselves were interested in recruit-
ment bonuses rather than the sale of products. 9
The Ger-Ro-Mar, Holiday Magic, Koscot, and Amway cases are clear
Commission precedent for the legal proposition that both a pyramid plan
itself, as well as the earnings claims based upon pyramided recruitment,
are inherently deceptive and thus illegal under section 5 of the FTC Act.7"
Although the decision of the court in Ger-Ro-Mar precludes the applica-
tion of an inherent deception standard to the pyramid plan itself, the stan-
dard may still be applied to earnings misrepresentations used to promote
the plan. The decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, have not articulated a uniform ap-
62. Imat716-17.
63. The earnings claims stated: "What do you want to make of your life?... An in-
come of $15,000 to $50,000 per year?" and "You can earn $12,000 a year." Id. at 732.
64. Id
65. Id at 738. In addition, the Commission found that Amway engaged in illegal re-
sale price maintenance at both the wholesale and retail levels. Id. at 717- 28.
66. 82. F.T.C. 488 (1973).
67. 93 F.T.C. at 732.
68. Id at715.
69. Id at 716-17.
70. See supra notes 49-66.
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proach to pyramid sales cases. The remainder of this article, therefore,
will suggest a method for effectively challenging pyramid sales schemes.
A PROPOSED LEGAL APPROACH
The authors of this article suggest that the Commission should continue
to apply the inherent deception standard to the earnings claims made by
pyramid promoters. Only this approach will stop pyramid schemes in
their infancy.71 Confining a pyramid challenge to earnings misrepresenta-
tions alone, using a summary approach, will be more effective than chal-
lenging the entire marketing plan. In the traditional business opportunity
case, the complainants must prove that the promised earnings were not
earned by the average or typical participant. Under the inherent decep-
tion approach, the deception is apparent from a mere perusal of the pyra-
mid plan and therefore, proof of actual failure to achieve the promised
earnings is unnecessary. Challenging only the earnings claims will be as
effective in correcting the deception perpetrated on prospective partici-
pants as will challenging the pyramid plan itself. Promoters of pyramid
plans will find the recruitment of participants very difficult without repre-
senting an expected level of earnings,7' particularly when selling to pros-
pects who believe that they are being offered a commercially feasible
business opportunity. Furthermore, this approach to challenging pyra-
mid schemes is in consonance with the decision of the court in Ger-Ro-
Mar, which struck down the application of an inherent deception stan-
dard to a pyramid sales plan but not to earnings claims based upon
pyramided recruitment.73 In the following sections, this article will de-
scribe the theories of inherently deceptive earnings claims and inevitable
injury to participants that should be used in prosecuting a pyramid sales
scheme under the inherent deception approach.
A. Deceptive Earnings Claims Made In The Promotion OfA Pyramid
Sales Scheme
Earnings claims typically made in connection with the promotion of a
pyramid sales scheme illustrate the inherent deception present in the
claims. A typical pyramid company, ABC Pyramid Company (hereinaf-
71. See supra note52.
72. Various types of earnings claims are presented by promoters to induce enthusi-
asm at promotional meetings. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d
476,479 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973) (promoters dressed in expensive clothes
throwing sums of cash about); Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 20 N.J. Super. 216,
229,293 A.2d 682,689 (Super. Ct. 1972) (a "money hum" used to induce enthusiasm).
73. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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ter referred to as "ABC"), requires each new participant to purchase a
sales kit that includes a sales manual. The sales manual describes the
multi-level program in the following manner:
If you sign up ten people and each in turn does the same for three levels,
see what happens:
Your Commission
Level Members Purchase Volume (10%)
1 10 $200 $20
2 100 $2,000 $200
3 1,000 $20,000 $2-000
• $2,220
That's $2,220per month! Go down ten levels and see what happens!74
Using these types of statements, the promoters of ABC represent that
the typical or average participant in the program can expect to earn at
least $2,220 per month. The earnings claim is deceptive because only a
very limited number of early participants have an opportunity to earn
$2,220, or any other significant amount. Using the assumption made by
ABC that each member would be able to recruit ten new members, one
million members would be at the sixth level and only the initial partici-
pant and the participants at the first, second, and third level, would have
earned as much as $2,220. The program would have to continue to the
ninth level for each of the one million participants to earn the promised
amount, at which point one billion people would be members of the ABC
pyramid sales scheme.7" The large numbers of distributors projected by
ABC could never be reached by ABC or by any other pyramid sales
scheme. The projected numbers could never be reached despite ABC
promises to each potential participant of an opportunity that only the pro-
74. Cf. Ger-Ro-Mar, Inc., 84 F.T.C. at 112-15.
75. The formula for the calculation of the number of members in any level "n" is the
simple n = x1, where "x" is the number of recruits per participant per level (in this case
x = 10) and"i" is thelevel (in this casei= 9). Thus, n = 10= 1 billion. Actually, the number
of members in the program by the time the plan reached nine levels would be higher
(1,111,111,1 10o)since all previous levels would, on these assumptions, still be "in" the pro-
gram. Thus, 10 gives only the number brought in at level nine. For presentpurposes, of
course, 100 million participants more or less make very little difference. Cf Ger-Ro-Mar,
Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d at 37 n.3.
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jected numbers couldfulfill.
Law enforcement agencies should not assume that a plan must lead to
saturation to be deceptive. The inherent vice of pyramid sales schemes is
not the high number of participants that the schemes must achieve to be
successful, but the inexorable rate of growth that the schemes must main-
tain if even early participants are to succeed. If pyramid sales schemes are
to succeed at all, growth must be exponential. The chance that any subse-
quent participant's success will be equal to the success of any prior or con-
temporary participant will always diminish in accordance with the
success of previous participants. Later participants, therefore, will always
have a lesser probability of success than earlier participants. Because the
same program with the same literature is used unchanged during the
course of a pyramid sales scheme, every later participant must have more
difficulty finding and convincing others tojoin the program. If an initial
participant had a one-in-ten chance of recruiting five new sponsorees,
then a later participant has a chance that is less than one-in-ten, a chance
decreased precisely by the success of the first participant and his contem-
poraries.
The odds need not increase at a strict exponential rate, however, for a
pyramid sales scheme to be inherently deceptive. Even if the rate of
growth is less than exponential, not all participants will drop out or fail to
recruit. The success of the remaining participants decreases the opportu-
nity for success of those who subsequently join the plan. (Persons who
drop out are effectively removed from the pool of potential recruits). Per-
sons who join later, however, are still offered the same proposition as
those who joined earlier. Participants are thus deceived before any theo-
retical "saturation" of the market occurs.76
In effect, a participant in a pyramid sales scheme exchanges money and
effort for (1) the right to purchase or sell goods, and (2) the right to profit
by recruiting other participants to purchase or sell the goods. The promise
of success conveyed to one distributor is the same promise the distributor
then conveys to the next generation of distributors, ad infinitum. The
chance of finding other recruits must decrease as a direct function of the
number of people already in the program. Each subsequent purchaser,
therefore, is in the position of being asked to join a program in which the
odds against finding new participants have necessarily shifted against
him. If this fact is not concealed, only an imprudent person wouldjoin the
program. Consequently, if the program is to succeed, new entrants must
be deceived by the pyramid Promoter and the initial distributors.
76. Seesupra note 17.
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B. Inevitable Injury To Participants
Promoters of pyramid sales schemes present the program as a commer-
cially feasible business opportunity. Most business opportunities require
a large investment of money and business acumen. A pyramid sales
scheme, on the other hand, promises the average person the opportunity
to earn large profits as an independent business person by investing time
and labor instead of a large amount of money. The pyramid sales scheme
often appeals to the unsophisticated person77 and is especially attractive
during times of economic uncertainty.78
Some early participants mayjoin out of greed, knowing that profits will
be gained at the expense of later participants. The great majority of par-
ticipants in pyramid sales schemes, however, joined what they thought
was a legitimate business opportunity. The unique strength of the pyra-
mid sales scheme is the power to attract participants to the plan. Partici-
pants are recruited into the program by promises of (1) goods to buy or sell
at a promised savings or profit, and (2) a chance, made attractive by refer-
ence to the power of pyramided recruitments, to earn substantial addi-
tional compensation.79 The participants are thus lured into the program
and induced to make a commitment to sales and recruitment by materi-
ally misleading promises of success. The participants lose their financial
investment as well as alternative opportunities for the use of their time
and labor.
Experience demonstrates that the operation of a pyramid sales scheme
inevitably results in consumer injury. Nonetheless, some participants will
be able to make some money. The chance that most participants in these
schemes will achieve any substantial amounts of earnings are slim to be-
gin with, however, and decrease exponentially as the program continues.
ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
Commission action is only one of several responses that may remedy
the problems of pyramid sales schemes. Other available means include:
(1) the operation of market forces, (2) action by state consumer protection
agencies, and (3) self-help remedies by injured participants. In this sec-
77. Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 235,293 A.2d 682
(Super. Ct. 1972) (program calculated to persuade gullible individuals to purchase distribu-
torships); 16 C.F.R. § 15.155(d) (1983) (marketing plan was not "designed as an offer to
knowledgeable businessmen competent to weigh and evaluate commercial risks").
78. In Koscot, the Commission noted the "staggering human toll" exacted by the
Koscot pyramid sales scheme in money borrowed,jobs quit, homes mortgaged, and even
bankruptcy. 86 F.T.C. at 1179. See also 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 676, 686-87 (1972) (description of
one investor's experience with the Dare To Be Great pyramid sales scheme).
79. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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tion, these alternative remedies will be discussed, and an explanation will
be given why Commission intervention can be an efficient and effective
way to protect the public from the inherent deception of pyramid sales
schemes.
A. Operation of Market Forces
A consumer ordinarily protects himself in the marketplace by choosing
among alternative products or among alternative uses of his money, time,
and labor. For this decision to be meaningful, however, it must be based
on full and accurate knowledge of the alternatives.8" Pyramid promoters
undermine this process by misrepresenting the earnings potential of their
distribution programs,8 ' thus making informed comparisons by prospec-
tive participants very difficult. A pyramid promoter has no incentive to
provide accurate information because the financial success of the scheme
is dependent upon these false promises.
The market will ordinarily accurately evaluate the worth of any busi-
ness opportunity, but the success of the pyramid promoter is predicated
on a taking of profits before the market evaluates the sales plan. Accurate
information about an opportunity will be slowly disseminated to the mar-
ket only after disgruntled participants both fail to achieve the promised
earnings and make their dissatisfaction known to other potential partici-
pants. In the interim, new recruits, deceived by the promotion, will con-
tinue to enter the scheme. Pyramid sales schemes are designed to exploit
the information failure of market forces by moving in and out of the mar-
ket quickly. Consequently, Commission action proves to be a more effec-
tive means to combat pyramid sales schemes.
B. State Action
Pyramid sales schemes are proliferating across the country and state
law enforcement agencies are not always able to cope with the problem
alone. Laws under which pyramid promoters are prosecuted vary among
the states, making a uniform or simultaneous state response difficult.82
The budgetary constraints placed upon many state consumer protection
80. See generally Pridgen & Preston, Enhancing the Flow of Information in the Mar-
ketplace: From Caveat Emptor to Virginia Pharmacy and Beyond at the Federal Trade Com-
mission, 14 GA. L. REV. 635 (1980); Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the
Regulation ofAdvertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661 (1977).
81. See, e.g., Ger-Ro-Mar, Inc., 84 F.T.C. at 149-50; Holiday Magic, Inc., 84F.T.C.
at 1032-35.
82. See Note, Pyramid Schemes: Dare to be Regulated, 61 GA. L.J. 1257(1973), for a
discussion of the various state enforcement approaches to pyramid sales schemes. See gen-
erally 54 A.L.R.3d 217 (1973).
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agencies also hinder the states in curbing pyramid sales schemes. State ac-
tion, therefore, does not always effectively curb pyramid companies. A
challenged company can simply move from one state to another, leaving
its distributors to face state law enforcement officials. A well-publicized
Commission order of nationwide scope is preferable to multifarious and
limited state responses.
C. Self-Help Remedies By Ijured Participants
The cost and difficulty of bringing individual lawsuits against an out-
of-state corporation will prevent most injured consumers from pursuing
individual remedies. Furthermore, the sponsoring distributor is often a
friend or relative83 and therefore, is unlikely to be sued. Preventive meas-
ures are preferable to individual or group attempts to recover lost money
that may have been secreted by the promoters. 84 Individual action is often
impractical because of the relatively large expense of recovering a moder-
ate financial loss. Even a class action by participants suffers from the dis-
advantage of requiring certification85 and the expense of notification,86 in
addition to the actual litigation costs. Commission challenges to the earn-
ings claims made by pyramid scheme promoters, as presented in this arti-
cle, would best minimize consumer harm caused by the pyramid company
and deter similar illegal conduct by others.
D. Commission Action
The authors believe that Commission action, utilizing the inherent de-
ception approach suggested in this article, would be the most effective and
efficient method of achieving a nationwide, uniform response to the very
serious problem presented by pyramid sales schemes. The Commission
has a number of available remedial tools,8 including: (1) civil penalties
from respondents, (2) civil penalties from nonrespondents, (3) consumer
redress after trial, and (4) temporary and permanent injunctions. Each of
these remedial options is discussed below.
83. Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 233-35, 293 A.2d
682,691-92 (Super Ct. 1972).
84. In Koscot, the Commission noted that $44 million had been taken from con-
sumers and only a fraction of the money had been accounted for. 86 F.T.C. at 1181.
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)(1).
86. Eisen v. Carlisle& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178-79(1974).
87. See Federal Trade Commission Operating Manual, Ch. 11 (the procedures and
criteria regardingjudicial action) [hereinafter referred to as Operating Manual].
1984 / Pyramid Sales Schemes
1. Civil Penalties From Respondents
A pyramid sales company that violates a final order of the Commission
is liable for civil penalties.88 A continuing violation is considered to be a
separate offense for each day the violation continues.89 Furthermore, fed-
eral district courts are authorized to issue injunctions and other equitable
relief to enforce Commission orders.90
2. Civil Penalties From Nonrespondents
Under section 205 of the FTC Act, the Commission can seek civil pen-
alties against a nonrespondent 9' when: (1) a person engages in acts or
practices that the Commission has held to be unlawful under the FTC Act
by issuing a cease and desist order, and (2) the person had actual knowl-
edge of the unlawfulness of the acts set forth in the previous order.9' Once
the Commission finds that a pyramid sales company has violated section
5 of the FTC Act by making earnings misrepresentations based upon pyr-
amid recruiting, a copy of the final order against that company can be
mailed to companies making similar earnings claims.93 Mailing of the or-
der satisfies the actual knowledge requirement.94 If the other pyramid
companies then fail to cease making the earnings misrepresentations, the
Commission can seek civil penalties against those companies in federal
district court.
3. Consumer Redress After Trial
Under section 19(a)(2) of the FTC Act,95 the Commission can seek con-
88. 15 U.S.C. §45(1) (1982); see, e.g., U.S. v. Bestline Products Corp., 412 F. Supp.
754 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The Bestline pyramid sales scheme and its founder, William E. Bailey
were found to be in non-compliance with a Commission consent order. The Court ulti-




91. A respondent, as used here, means a company or individual who is under a
Commission order for having engaged in unlawful acts or practices. A nonrespondent is a
company or individual not under Commission order but is engaging in the same unlawful
acts or practices as the respondent.
92. 15 U.S.C. §45(m)(1)(B) (1982). See generally I S. KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION §§ 10.07.09 (1979).
93. See Operating Manual, supra note 87, Ch. 11, §2.2 (Commission's section 205
procedures).
94. See Operating Manual, supra note 87, Ch. 11, §2.2.4; 1 S. KANWIT, FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION § 10.09 (1979). In a civil penalty action against a nonrespondent, all
issues of fact in that action must be tried de novo in the federal district court. 15 U.S.C.
§45(m)(2) (1982).
95. 15 U.S.C. §57b (a)(2) (1982). See F.T.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,
446 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (for the firstjudicial interpretation of the consumer re-
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sumer redress in federal district court or in any state court of competent
jurisdiction against a person who is subject to a final cease and desist or-
der. The challenged act or practice must be one that under the circum-
stances, a "reasonable man" would have known was dishonest or
fraudulent96 - a standard more stringent than that required in an admin-
istrative proceeding to enforce section 5.97 The challenged act or practice
must also have occurred within three years prior to the date the Commis-
sion complaint is issued.98
Given the decision of the court in Ger-Ro-Mar, the authors doubt that
the Commission will authorize the use of section 19 until a clear precedent
is established. Whether a pyramid recruiting scheme can meet the re-
quired "dishonest or fraudulent" standard is also undecided. Persuasive
arguments support the proposition, however, that a pyramid promoter
who makes earnings claims based upon the pyramiding of new recruits
acts dishonestly and is subject to redress under section 19.99
4. Injunctions
Under section 13(b) of the FTC Act, the Commission can seek an in-
junction in federal district court whenever it has reason to believe that a
law enforced by the Commission will be violated and action by the Com-
mission is in the public interest."° Under section 13(b), a temporary re-
straining order or preliminary injunction is authorized upon a showing
that granting relief would be in the public interest, based upon a balancing
of the equities and the ultimate likelihood of success of the Commis-
sion. 11 If a Commission complaint is not filed within twenty days after is-
dress statute). See generally 2 S. KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION §§21.03-.06
(1979).
96. 15 U.S.C. §57b (a)(2) (1982).
97. In a section 5 administrative proceeding, absence of knowledge of falsity is not
a defense. See, e.g., Gimbel Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 116 F.2d 578,579 (2d Cir. 1941).
98. 15 U.S.C. §57b (d) (1982).
99. See FTC v. Glenn W. Turner [1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,224] No. 79-474-
ORL-R (M.D. Fla. December 29,1982). In granting the FTC's motion for partial summaryjudgment, the court found Turner liable for redress to consumers who purchased distribu-
torships in his pyramid sales scheme because his actions were of a nature that a "reasonable
man would have known under the circumstances were dishonest and fraudulent," and
which were "reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and compre-
hension." Id. at 69,451. The court ordered Turner to refund $29,299,384 plus interest to
25,000 distributors. Regulatory and Legal Developments, No. 200, at A-24 (Oct. 14,1983).
See also FTC v. Mac Millan, Inc., [ 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,553] No. 81 C 6053 (N.D.
Ill. August 3, 1983). The court indicated that for the purpose of obtaining consumer redress
under section 19, the acts and practices should fall at least within the mail fraud statute, 18
U.S.C. section 1341 (1982). The acts need only be reasonably calculated to deceive persons
of ordinary prudence and comprehension. Id at 68,756. Section 19 does not require proof
of a defendant's actual intent to defraud consumers. Id. at 68,759.
100. 15 U.S.C. §53(b)(1982). See generally IS. KANWIT, FEDERALTRADECOMMIS-
SION § 10.04 (1979) (explanation of injunction-granting process).
101. F.T.C. v. Virginia Homes Manufacturing Co., 509 F. Supp. 51 (D. Md.), afj'd,
661 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1981).
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suance, however, the order or injunction is dissolved. 102 Section 13(b) also
gives the federa-district court authority to grant permanent injunctions in
routine cases even though the Commission does not contemplate any ad-
ministrative proceedings. 0 3
The authors have concluded in this article that Commission precedent
exists for the legal proposition that earnings claims based upon
pyramided recruitment are inherently deceptive and violate section 5 of
the FTC Act. Consequently, a section 13(b) injunction action seems to be
an appropriate remedy. The decision of the court in Ger-Ro-Mar, how-
ever, creates doubt about the current viability of this theory. A federal dis-
trict court judge may not view the law as sufficiently settled to grant an
injunction. Given this uncertainty, the authors believe that an administra-
tive case-by-case approach is more prudent. Once the inherent deception
standard is applied to the earnings claims of a pyramid sales scheme in an
FTC order, a section 13(b) injunction action or a section 205 approach
might well become the most effective and efficient remedy.
CONCLUSION
Pyramid sales schemes are promoted as commercially feasible business
opportunities in which participants are all promised an opportunity to
earn profits by selling products anda chance, made attractive by reference
to pyramided recruitments, to earn substantial, additional earnings. The
chance that all or even most of the participants will achieve any large
amounts of earnings is very small. Pyramid schemes tend to appeal to un-
sophisticated persons and are especially alluring during economically un-
certain periods.
The natural operation of the marketplace, private legal action, and ac-
tion by state agencies are not always effective in curbing the vice inherent
in pyramid sales schemes. Commission action, however, can be an effec-
tive and efficient way to protect the public against pyramid promoters. By
applying the inherent deception standard set forth in this article to the
earnings misrepresentations, the Commission can quickly stop a pyramid
sales scheme before thousands of participants are injured. A Commission
challenge to the earnings claims can be effective because a pyramid pro-
moter will find the recruitment of participants impossible without repre-
senting an expected level of earnings.
102. 15U.S.C.§53(b)(1982).
103. See F.T.C. v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1982).
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